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COMMENTS

REFUGE IN AMERICA: WHAT BURDEN
OF PROOF?
INTRODUCTION

The Refugee Act of 19801 proclaims as its purpose the continuation of this country's long heritage of welcoming the displaced and persecuted. 2 Underlying that admirable
proclamation, however, is the recognition that the United States
cannot continue to accept unlimited numbers of refugees indis1. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (codified in
various sections of 8 U.S.C.). The underlying legislative reports are H.R.
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (accompanying S. 643); H.R.REP.
No. 781 (Conference Rep. 1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS 160;
S.R. No. 590 (Conference Rep. 1980).
2. The preamble of the Act states that its intention includes the
"[h]istoric policy of the United States to respond to the urgent needs of
persons subject to persecution in their homelands .... ." Refugee Act of
1980 § 101(a), 8 U.S.C. note at § 1521 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The legislative
history of the Act is replete with demonstrations of humanitarian concern.
For example, one witness for the State Department testified, "[w] e should
remember that the United States is a land of immigrants, and since the
founding of the Republic we have had a special national heritage of concern
for the uprooted and persecuted . .. ." Hearings on H.R. 3056 before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship and InternationalLaw of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1977). Another example is
the testimony of the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service to the effect that the most important factor to consider is "our national tradition of humanitarian concern. It seems to me that it is on that
basis and from that point of our national drive and tradition that we have
admitted most of the refugees over the past 20 years." Id. at 91. Finally, the
words of Congressman Rodino, a strong supporter of the Act, reflect the
attitude of many of the legislators involved in its passage. According to
him, the Act is
one of the most important pieces of humanitarian legislation ever en[It] confirm[ed] what this Govacted by a United State Congress ....
By the deep
ernment and the American people are all about ....
[has]
dedication and untiring efforts, the United States once again ...
demonstrated its concern for the homeless, the defenseless, and the
persecuted peoples who do fall victim to tyrannical and oppressive governmental regimes.
126 CONG. REC. 1519 (1980). See generally Anker & Posner, The Forty Year
Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 9 (1981).
REP. No. 608, 96th
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criminately. 3 For a nation of immigrants, the selection of those
who will be granted the right to enter the country and to remain
is a persistent problem.
According to current estimates, at least fourteen million refugees exist in the world. 4 Even if the United States accepted
every one of them, 5 world events could always create more. Accordingly, the Refugee Act of 1980 represents an attempt to provide a permanent method for selecting and admitting refugees
6
to this country.
Prior to the 1980 Act, aliens had the burden of proving that
they were entitled to refugee status;7 that burden has not been
3. See Anker & Posner, supra note 2, at 11. Some have said that the
proposition of a national concern for refugees is specious. According to one
commentator, "[a]n ambivalent policy toward refugees emerges from any
recounting of this recent history ..
" Evans, The PoliticalRefugee in U.S.
ImmigrationLaw and Practice, 3 INT'L LAw 204, 249 (1969). It has also been
observed that
[t]he history of immigration laws in the United States is a tale of accommodation between the humanitarian goal of accepting into this
country those immigrants who seek to build a new life here and a variety of reasons for restricting immigration. In retrospect, one cannot be
proud of all the measures taken by Congress in the past ....
Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 452-53 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
If no other argument can be made, the admission of refugees is certainly costly; total refugee costs for 1981 were estimated to be $1,687,300,000.
Estimated Costs of Refugee Assistance in Fiscal Year 1981, 5 REFUGEES &
HUMAN RIGHTS, NEWSLETrER 22, 24 (1981). See generally Elgass, Federal
Funding of United States Refugee Resettlement Before and After the Refugee
Act of 1980, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES 179 (1982).

For the purposes of this introduction only, the term "refugee" will be
used in a generic sense. See infra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
4. Gross, Open Up America!, 10:2 HUMAN RIGHTS 26 (1982).
5. It is estimated that refugee admission from 1948 through 1979 exceeded 1.7 million. Scanlan, Regulating Refugee Flow: Legal Alternatives
and Obligationsunder the Refugee Act of 1980, 56 NOTRE DAME LAw. 618, 620
(1981).
6. According to the preamble: "[tlhe objectives of this Act are to pro-

vide a permanent and systematic procedure for the admission to this country of refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States and to
provide comprehensive and uniform provisions for the effective resettlement and absorption of those refugees who are admitted." Refugee Act of
1980 § 101(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1521 note (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
7. See generally 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 2.24Ae (1981). The Constitution gives Congress the exclusive
authority to formulate immigration policy. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Con-

sider the discussion infra 29-31 regarding the possible conflict between the
legislative and the executive branches with regard to immigration. Congress may decide which aliens shall be allowed to enter and what procedure
will be used to determine their admissibility. Nonresident aliens have no
absolute right to enter the United States as nonimmigrants or otherwise.
The admission of aliens to the United States is a privilege granted by the
sovereign government and may be granted only upon the terms as that government shall provide. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 409 U.S. 753 (1972); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580
(1952); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Louis v. Nelson, 544 F.
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changed.8 The 1980 Act, however, has failed to make clear what
degree of proof is required in order to establish eligibility.9 ConSup. 973 (S.D. Fla. 1982); 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976). There is probably no area of

law in which Congress has greater freedom from judicial review. E.g., Fiallo
v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948);
Nishimura Ekiu v. U.S., 142 U.S. 651 (1892). For example, Congress can legitimately make distinctions among and against aliens that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens. E.g. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976);
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954). Nevertheless, some limits do exist. In
the enforcement of its immigration policies, the government must respect
the procedural safeguards of due process. E.g. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67
(1976); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Wong Yan Sung v. McGrath, 339
U.S. 33 (1950).
Congress has charged the Attorney General with the responsibility for
the administration and enforcement of immigration policies. 8 U.S.C. § 1103
(1976). The Attorney General acts through the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103, 1551 (1976). See also 8 C.F.R. § 2.1
(1983). INS is managed by a Commissioner. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103, 1552 (1976).
See generally 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra, at § 2.24A(f). The Commissioner has delegated his authority to the district directors of the various
INS offices. 8 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1983). The authority of INS is limited by both
the general restrictions of the Constitution and statutes passed by Congress. Courts are permitted to review INS actions for both misinterpretation of the law and misapplication. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291-92
(1965) (general concept of review to assure administrative agency's decision complies with statutory mandate or with policy); Tejeda v. INS, 346
F.2d 389, 392 (9th Cir. 1965) (court review insures against decisions based on
inadequate findings, findings contrary to law, or findings reached without
regard to proper procedure); Rongetti v. Meelly, 27 F.2d 281, 284 (7th Cir.
1953) (stating classic approach for leaving stand administrative determinations "unless, upon the record, the proceedings were manifestly unfair, or
substantial evidence to support the administrative finding is lacking, or error of law has been committed, or the evidence reflects a manifest abuse of
discretion"). See 2 GORDON & RoSENFIELD, supra, at §§ 8.12(a), 8.17(b). In
addition, INS must adhere to its own regulations. United States v. Wixon,
418 U.S. 683 (1974); United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S.
260 (1954). Where granted the authority to act by discretion, INS must not
exercise its discretion arbitrarily or capriciously. Henry v. INS, 552 F.2d 130
(5th Cir. 1977). See generally 2 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra at § 8.15(c).
See, Fleurinor v. INS, 585 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1978); Martineau v. INS, 556 F.2d
306 (5th Cir. 1977); Henry v. INS, 552 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1977); Daniel v. INS,
528 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1976); Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1975);
Shubash v. INS, 450 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1971).
8. 8 C.F.R. § 208.5 (1983); 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1983).
9. Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted sub nom.,
I.N.S. v. Stevic, 103 S. Ct. 1249 (1983) (no "bright line" drawn in the legislative history). See generally Kurzban, Restructuring the Asylum Process, 19
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 91, 107 (1981).
The definition of "burden of proof' contains two elements: the requirement to prove a fact exists; and the obligation to establish the existence of
that fact to a requisite degree of belief in the mind of the trier of fact.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 178 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). In litigation, some allowance must be made for possible error in the fact-finding process. Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958). One method is to adjust the burden of
proof to the likelihood of error and to the interests at stake. The Supreme
Court has recognized this approach on a number of occasions. For example, Justice Harlan once wrote that the function of a standard of proof is to
"instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society
thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a partic-
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sequently, since the passage of the Act, the determination of the
degree of proof required by an alien seeking refuge in the
United States has presented a significant dilemma.' 0
This comment begins with a brief survey of refugee law in
the United States which identifies and defines the distinct categories of aliens seeking refugee status. The comment then proceeds to discuss three fundamental issues. First, was the same
degree of proof applied to all aliens prior to enactment of the
Refugee Act of 1980? Second, did Congress intend the Act to require the same degree of proof of all aliens, and if so, what standard should be used? Finally, have different standards
continued to be used since the passage of the Act? The comment concludes with a proposal for resolving the apparent conular type of adjudication." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). In a more recent case, Chief Justice Burger similarly observed
that "[t]he standard serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision .... [and that] we must be mindful that the function of legal process
is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions." Addington v. ITexas, 441
U.S. 418, 423-25 (1979).
Because the consequences of a wrong decision in refugee matters may
sometimes be as serious as an erroneous decision in a capital punishment
case, it is important that the burden of proof placed upon the applicant be
equitably distributed and administered. See generally Kurzban, supra, at
108-113 (burden of proof is not equitably distributed between government
and alien in these cases). INS is required to request the views of the De-

partment of State before making a decision on these requests, unless the
request is clearly meritorious or clearly frivolous. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7 (1983).

The State Department reports are frequently relied upon by INS in making
the final decision and this policy has been endorsed by the courts. E.g.,
Zamora v. INS, 534 F.2d 1055 (2d Cir. 1976); Hosseinmardi v. INS, 405 F.2d 25
(9th Cir. 1968), rehearingdenied, 405 F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1969); Asghari v. INS,

396 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1968); Namkung v. Boyd, 226 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1955). It

has been contended, however, that the State Department reports are not
always reliable because
[s]uch letters from the State Department do not carry the guarantees
of reliability which the law demands of admissible evidence. A frank,
but official discussion of the political shortcomings of a friendly nation
is not always compatible with the high duty to maintain advantageous
diplomatic relations with nations through the world.
Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675, 677 n.1 (9th Cir. 1968). The above problem
makes it all the more imperative that the burden of proof placed on the
alien be equitable.
10. The opposing views are aptly illustrated by the decisions of two key
cases. See Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1982); Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d
401 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted sub nom., I.N.S. v. Stevic, 103 S. Ct. 1249
(1983). For a discussion of the Stevic case, see infra notes 138-43 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Rejaie, see infra notes 152-60 and accompanying text. It has been contended that by promulgating regulations
which offer only minimal guidelines, INS in effect decides the outcome of
these requests in any way it wants. Comment, Due Process Rightsfor Excludable Aliens under United States Immigration Law and the United Nations ProtocolRelating to the Status of Refugees-HaitianAliens, A Case in
Point, 10 N.Y.U. L.J. INT'L L. &POL. 203 (1977). See also infra note 108 and
accompanying text.
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flict surrounding the appropriate burden of proof to be applied

in refugee cases.
CLASSIFICATION OF ALIENS SEEKING REFUGE

A common definition of a refugee is "one who flees for refuge or safety, especially to a foreign country."'" The standard
definition of asylum in international law is a "temporary refuge
granted political offenders."' 12 Consequently, the normal conno13
tation of asylum would include every harborage of a refugee.
The Act, however, reserves the term "asylum" for aliens requesting sanctuary either at a port of entry or while physically
present in the United States.' 4 The specific label of "refugee" is
only applied to aliens already granted that status prior to entry.' 5 A third category, "withholding of deportation," tends to
overlap with the asylum provision. "Withholding of deportation" refers to an alien who requests that his deportation be
withheld on the grounds that it would result in a threat to his
life or freedom. 16 The relief available under the "withholding"
category is distinct from that offered by an actual grant of asylum, 17 but they are closely related because the same burden of
proof has been applied to both forms of relief. 18 This comment
will maintain the distinction among the various groups by limiting the use of its terms as defined above.
Refugees
Originally, the immigration laws of the United States made
no specific provision for the admission of refugees.' 9 The refugees who did obtain entry usually came as immigrants under
other provisions within the immigration laws. 20 Beginning in
the late nineteenth century, Congress enacted various laws
which resulted in restricted admission of aliens in general, and
11. THE AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1018 (1962).

12. Id. at 77.
13. See 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, at § 2.24Af.

14. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).

15. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (A) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
16. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
17. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
19. Soewapadji v. Wixon, 157 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329
U.S. 792. See generally 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, at § 2.24Aa;
Evans, supra note 3, at 204; Note, A Comparative Overview of the
Vietnamese and Cuban Refugee Crises: Did the Refugee Act of 1980 Change
Anything?, 6 SUFFOLK TRANS. L.J. 25 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Crises].
20.

1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, at § 2.24Aa. See also Evans,

supra note 3, at 205.
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refugees in particular. 21 A change in the nation's attitude toward refugees resulted from its participation in World War 11.22
In the post-war period, the United States was actively involved
in the rehabilitation and resettlement of refugees. 23 The postwar involvement, however, was primarily on an ad hoc basis,
24
consisting of a series of responses to temporary crises.
The first permanent statutory basis for the admission of refugees was established by the 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act. 25 Refugees admitted pursuant to this
legislation were commonly referred to as "conditional entrant
refugees" or "seventh preference immigrants. ' 26 For a variety of
21. For an overview of legislation in this area, see TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES, app. II (1982). The impact of these restrictions
was most obvious in the period before World War II when thousands of
refugees fleeing Nazi oppressions were not permitted to enter the United
States. 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, at § 2.24Aa.
22. 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, at § 2.24Aa.
23. For a comprehensive review of U.S. participation in the resettlement
of refugees, see H.R. REP. No. 1066, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1970). See generally 1 GORDON &ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, at § 2.24Aa; Evans, supra note 3,
at 211. Note, Crises, supra note 19, at 25-31.
24. It has been said that "[iun good measure, our country's humanitarian tradition of extending a welcome to the world's homeless has been accomplished in spite of, not because of, our laws relating to refugees."
Hearings on H.R. 2816 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and
Int'l Law of the House Comm. of the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)
Statement of Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on H.R. 2816]. See generally 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note
7, at § 2.24Aa; Anker &Posner, supra note 2, at 10-12; Note, The Right of Asylum under United States ImmigrationLaw, 33 U. FLA.L. REV. 539, 541 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Right of Asylum]. Congress passed the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009, which provided
for the admission of 400,000 refugees. This act expired in 1951. See generally 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, at § 2.24Aa; Anker & Posner,
supra note 2, at 13; Note, Right of Asylum, supra, at 541. This was followed
by the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-243, 67 Stat. 400, which permitted the entry of nearly 300,00 more refugees. This act expired in 1956.
See generally 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, at § 2.24Aa; Anker &
Posner, supra note 2, at 14; Note, Right of Asylum, supra at 541. The Fair
Share Law, Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 504 (1960), was passed by Congress to
authorize the Attorney General to admit "a fair share" of those refugees
remaining in the camps in Europe. See generally 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD,
supra note 7, at § 2.24Aa; Anker & Posner, supra note 2, at 15. In addition,
Congress passed the Refugee-Escapee Act, which authorized the admission
of victims of racial, religious, or political persecution fleeing from communist or communist-dominated countries or a country in the general area of
the Middle East. Act of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639. See
generally, Anker & Posner, supra note 2, at 17.
25. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (repealed 1980).
26. To qualify as a conditional entrant refugee, the alien had to establish the following: (1) departure from a communist dominated country or
from a country within the general area of the Middle East; (2) the departure
constituted "flight"; (3) such flight was caused by persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion; and (4) an inability or unwillingness to return. Id. See generally, Anker & Posner, supra
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reasons, these provisions were inadequate from inception. 2 7 In
addition to geographic and ideological limitations on admission
qualifications, the provisions were not sufficiently flexible.
Emergency situations involving large numbers of refugees created problems because of the numerical restrictions. Refugees
in the western hemisphere simply were not covered. 28 These
problems were frequently resolved through the President's use
of the parole power contained within the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 29 The use of the parole power 3° to
note 2, at 17-18; Note, Right of Asylum, supra note 4, at 543. While conditional entrants were not admitted as immigrants, they were eligible for permanent residence after two years physical presence in the United States.
Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. 89-236, 79 Stat. 91 (repealed 1980). See generally
Anker & Posner, supra note 2, at 18.
27. Anker & Posner, supra note 2, at 19.
28. 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, at § 2.24Aa; Anker & Posner,
supra note 2, at 18.
29. The parole power, in pertinent part, states
[t]he Attorney General may, except as provided in subparagraph (B),
in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such
conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for reasons
deemed strictly in the public interest any alien applying for admission
to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded
as an admission of the alien and when the purposes of such parole
shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General, have been served the
alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he
was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in
the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the
United States.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
This statute was amended in 1980 to include a limitation on the use of
parole. The statute now further provides that
[t] he Attorney General may not parole into the United States an alien
who is a refugee unless the Attorney General determines that compelling reasons in the public interest with respect to that particular alien
require that the alien be paroled into the United States rather than be
admitted as a refugee....
Id. § 1182(d) (5) (B). This provision was intended to resolve the conflict between the executive and the legislative branches over basic immigration
policy. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. Paroled aliens were
not considered immigrants. Although they were permitted to remain in the
United States and work, special legislation was required to grant them resident status. E.g., Hungarian Refugees Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. 85-559, 72
Stat. 419; Cuban Refugees Act of November 2, 1966, Pub. L. 89-732, 79 Stat.
919; Indochina Refugees Act of October 28, 1977; Pub. L. 95-145, 91 Stat. 1223
(Title I). It was asserted that Congress, by passing these acts, acquiesced
in the President's use of the parole power. See generally 1 GORDON & RoSENFIELD, supra note 7, at § 2.54; Anker & Posner, supra note 2, at 18-19;
Note, Refugees Under United States Immigration Law, 24 CLEVELAND STATE
L. REV. 528 (1975); Comment, Refugee-Parolee: The Dilemma of the Indochinese Refugee, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 175 (1975).
30. Parole programs have been used for a variety of mass refugee
groups, including Hungarians, Czechoslovakians, Poles, Ugandan-Asians,
Chileans, Chinese refugees from Hong Kong, Cubans, and the Indo-chinese.
Anker & Posner, supra note 2, at 15-22.
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admit large numbers of refugees outside the statutory scheme
resulted in frequent conflicts between the President and
31
Congress.
The Refugee Act of 1980 was intended, in part, to end this
conflict by its comprehensive treatment of the refugee problem.32 The Act established a permanent method for the admission and absorption of refugees. 33 Major changes have been
made by the Act. The annual allotment of numbers under the
Act dramatically increased the number of admissions which
were permitted under the now abolished 1965 amendments. 3 4
35
Geographic and ideological requirements were eliminated.
Moreover, the use of the parole power3 6 to admit groups of refugees was also restricted. The most significant reform produced
by the Act, however, was the creation, for the first time, of a statutory definition of "refugde." This definition explicitly and intentionally adopted the international definition used in the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 37 Basically, the
term refugee now refers to
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality
or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any
country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is
unable or unwilling to return to, and, is unable or unwilling to avail
himself or herself of the protection of that country because of persecution or a well-foundedfear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
31. Congress originally intended the use of the parole power to be lim-

ited to emergent, individual and isolated situations. Parole developed, however, into an ad hoc program of refugee admission at the discretion of the
President, acting through the Attorney General. Without guidelines for
consultation or predefined eligibility criteria, admission of refugee groups
through the parole power became a matter of political or foreign policy,
rather than individual determination. Anker & Posner,supra note 2,at 1819. See also Note, Crises, supra note 19, at 34.
32. Anker & Posner,supra note 2, at 12 (the Act as resolution of execu-

tive and legislative conflict over right to determine immigration policy).
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1521 note (1976 &Supp. IV 1980). Although such refugees

are still
not admitted as immigrants, they are allowed to acquire permanent
residence status after one year of.physical presence in the United States. 8
U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See also 8 C.F.R. § 209.1 (1983).
34. Under prior law, only 17,400 conditional entrant refugees were permitted to enter annually. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (repealed 1980). Now the
law provides for admission of up to 50,000 refugees each year. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1157(a)(1) (1976 & Supp.V 1981).
35. The definition of "refugee" isno longer limited by any geographic or
ideological requirements. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.

36. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
37. The Conference Reports emphasized that the purpose was to create
a nondiscriminatory definition of refugee which conformed to the United
Nations definition. H.R.REP.No.781, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 19 (1980); S.REP.
No. 590, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980). For a discussion of the United Nations definition of refugee and the 1951 Convention Relating to the status of

Refugees, see infra note 95 and accompanying text.
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Asylum
The Refugee Act also resulted in changes for "asylum" applicants. 39 Prior to the Act, a nonimmigrant alien physically
present in the United States who satisfied the eligibility requirements of conditional entrant refugees 4° could apply for classification as a "refugee" after a period of two years. 4 1 An alien could
also apply for "asylum" under an informal procedure which had
developed in the absence of direct statutory authority. 42 This
procedure implemented rights already existing in immigration
regulations and under the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees (Protocol).43 The application for "asylum" could be made only to a district director of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service. 44 The district director's decision,
45
which was discetionary, was final.
38. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (A) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added).
The statute also states that
in such special circumstances as the President after appropriate consultation ...may specify, any person who is within the country of such
person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality,
within the country in which such person is habitually residing, and who
is persecuted or who has a well-foundedfear of persecution on account
of race, religion, nationality,membership in a particularsocial group,
or political opinion.
Id. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (emphasis added). The statute further identifies
groups which are excluded from consideration as refugees. A refugee could
not be "any person who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated
in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." Id.
39. 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, at § 2.3i.
40. See supra note 26.
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (7) (repealed 1980).
42. This procedure has been codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1976 & Supp.
V 1981). The procedure was originally initiated because of the Kudirka affair. A Soviet sailor jumped from his ship onto a U.S. ship while both were
in U.S. territorial waters. Without any provision for presenting his asylum
request, the sailor was returned to the Soviet vessel. See Evans, supra note
3.
43. Yan Wo Cheng v. Rinaldi, 389 F. Supp. 583 (D.N.J. 1975). The courts
rejected arguments that asylum applicants were entitled to full constitutional protections. See generally 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, at
§ 2.24Af. Essentially the Protocol is an extension of a United Nations agreement on the treatment of refugees after World War H. For a full discussion
of the 1967 Protocol, see infra note 95.
44. Matter of Chumpitazi, 16 I. & N. Dec. 629, 631-32 (1978). The current
version of this regulation is at 8 C.F.R. § 208.1 (1983).
45. The current version is at 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(a) and (c) (1983). While
there was no appeal from the district director's decision, applicants denied
asylum were permitted to request the withholding of a deportation order if
they alleged potential persecution in the country to which they were ordered deported. See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
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The Act, for the first time, grants statutory approval to this
informal procedure. 46 The most significant feature of the new
provision is that it makes the qualifications for obtaining asylum
co-extensive with the qualifications for obtaining refugee status
because both are based on the same definition of refugee. 47 In
pertinent part, the Act states that
[tjhe Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien
physically present in the United States or at a land border or port
of entry, irrespective of such alien's status, to apply for asylum, and
the alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney
Generalif the Attorney General determines that such alien is a 48refugee within the meaning of section 1101(a) (42) (A) of this title.

Withholding of Deportation
A provision frequently confused with "asylum" is one which
permits an order of deportation to be withheld.49 The object of a
deportation hearing is the removal of an alien deemed to be undesirable. 50 Deportation is an administrative proceeding 51 and
is not considered punishment for a crime. 52 A deportation order
may, nevertheless, be "a drastic measure and at times the
equivalent of banishment or exile, '5 3 depriving a man of "all
'54
that makes life worth living."
The power to withhold deportation first appeared in the immigration laws as a prohibition on the deportation of an alien to
any country in which the alien would be subjected to physical
persecution.5 5 The provision was continued intact in the Internal Security Act of 1950.56 Although physical persecution was
not defined, subsequent practice usually limited it to incarcera46. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See generally 1 GORDON &
ROSENFIELD, supra note 7 at § 2.24Af.

47. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added).
49. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9 (1983). See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
50. There are nineteen general provisions by which an alien may become deportable. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
51. The deportation procedure is described in 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976).
The process begins when an alien is issued an order to show cause why he
should not be deported. Once an order to show cause has been issued, an
alien is not eligible to submit his request for asylum to the district director.
8 C.F.R. § 208.3 (1983). See infra note 67 and accompanying text. The subject of deportation is given extensive treatment in 1A GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, at § 4.
52. Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S.
585, 591 (1913).
53. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948), citing, Delgadillo v.
Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388 (1947).
54. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
55. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, Pub. L. 64-301, 39 Stat. 874 § 20(a).
56. Pub. L. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987 § 20(a) (repealed 1952).
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tion, corporal punishment, torture, or death based upon one's
race, religion, or political opinion.5 7 In 1965, the phrase "persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion" was sub58
The
stituted for the requirement of physical persecution.
recognition that the "techniques of persecution are not limited
to bodily violence alone" 59 implied an ameliorative intent behind the amendment, but the extent of the liberalization was
never clear. 60 Another modification of the provision 6 ' underscored the discretionary nature of the power to withhold deportation. 62 This exercise of discretionary authority had been
63
found to be a constitutional delegation of legislative power.
The Refugee Act has eliminated the discretionary nature of
the decision to withhold deportation. The relevant section now
states that "[t] he Attorney General shall not deport or return
any alien ... to a country if the Attorney General determines
that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such
country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion. '64 Accordingly,
the exercise of the power to withhold deportation is now
mandatory when the Attorney General determines that the
alien falls within one of the designated categories. 65 The withholding provision, like the definition of "refugee," tracks the language of the Protocol. 66 A request for asylum made during a
57. Blazina v. Bouchard, 286 F.2d 507, 511 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S.

950 (1961). See generally Frank, Effect of the 1967 United Nations Protocol
on the Status of Refugees in the United States, 11 INT'L LAw. 291, 293 (1977).
58. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1976) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1976
& Supp. V 1981)).
59. H.R. REP. No. 745, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1965).
60. 1A GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, at § 5.16b. See also Frank,

supra note 57, at 293.

61. 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (1952) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981)).
62. Khalil v. INS, 457 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1972) (power to withhold deportation discretionary). Accord Fu v. INS, 386 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968); Lena v. INS, 379 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1967); Blazina v.
Bouchard, 286 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961); Chi
Sheng Liu v. Holton, 297 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1961); Obrenovic v. Pilliod, 282
F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1960); Wang v. Pilliod, 285 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1960); Cakmar
v. Hoy, 265 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1959); United States ex rel. Cantisani v. Holton,
248 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 932 (1958); Namkung v.
Boyd, 226 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1955). Cf. Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir.
1977) (possible limitation on discretion due to U.S. signing of Protocol). Accord Daniel v. INS, 528 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1976); Shkukani v. INS, 435 F.2d 25
(9th Cir. 1969).
63. Obrenovic v. Pilliod, 282 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1960).
64. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added).
65. The Protocol may already have made this provision mandatory. See
infra note 97 and accompanying text.
66. Congress made it clear that the intent was to conform to international law. "The Conference substitute adopted the House provision with
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deportation proceeding will automatically include a request for
67
withholding deportation.
BURDEN OF PROOF BEFORE THE REFUGEE ACT

The importance of the withholding provision discussed
above stems from the fact that it is the principal source of case
law regarding the burden of proof aliens are required to meet
when seeking refuge in the United States. There is no appeal
68
when overseas refugees are denied entry to the United States.
Furthermore, there is no appeal for the denial of an asylum request.6 9 The regulations do permit an alien whose asylum request has been denied by the district director to reopen his
request during a deportation hearing.70 The decision reached in
that deportation hearing is reviewable by the Board of Immigration Appeals. 71 After these administrative remedies have been
the understanding that it is based directly upon the language of the Protocol and it is intended that the language be construed consistent with the
Protocol." S. REP. No. 590, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1979). For a discussion
of the Protocol, see infra note 95.
67. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9 (1983). This results in a confusing dichotomy in that
the distinction between the forms of relief may be blurred. 1A GORDON &
ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, at § 5.8f. Although the terms are often used interchangeably, a request for withholding deportation is not equivalent to a request for asylum. See, e.g., Matter of Lam, INS Interim Dec. #2857 (Mar. 24,
1981); Matter of Castellon, 17 I. & N. Dec. 616 (1981). The usual distinction is
made based upon the types of relief offered. A grant of asylum, for example, may eventually lead to an adjustment of status as a permanent resident. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See also 8 C.F.R. § 209.2
(1983). Withholding an order of deportation, however, is only specific with
reference to one country and does not mean that the alien may not be deported if another country is willing and able to receive him. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(h) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See, e.g., Matter of Lam, INS Interim Dec.
2857 (Mar. 24, 1981). See also HEARINGS ON H.R. 2816, supra note 24 at 168-86.
Recent decisions indicate that INS may now appreciate the fine distinction
which exists between these two forms of relief. See infra notes 164-65 and
accompanying text.
68. Nonresident aliens have no right of entry. The discretionary denial
of an alien's request to enter is not subject to review. See supra note 7 and
accompanying text. See also 2 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, at
§ 8.21; Anker & Posner, supra note 2, at 83.
69. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(c) (1983). See also 2 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra
note 7, at § 2.24Af; Anker & Posner, supra note 2, at 76.
70. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9 (1983). See also 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note
7, at § 2.24Af.
71. 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(b) (1983). See also 1A GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra
note 7, at § 5.12(c) and 5.13(a). The Board of Immigration Appeals is under
the control of the Attorney General. The Board is not a statutory body and
exists only by virtue of the Attorney General's regulations. It exercises his
authority and discretion in deportation cases. 8 C.F.R., Part 3; § 19, Dept. of
Justice Order 175-59, 25 FR 2460 (March 28, 1960). See generally 1 GORDON &
ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, at § 1.10.
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73
exhausted,7 2 judicial review is finally possible.
The fact that the Attorney General's decision could be
based on discretion under prior law 74 restricted the scope of judicial review. 75 The courts could only review a case to determine whether the Attorney General had abused his discretion
or exercised it in an arbitrary or capricious fashion.7 6 Under
current law, however, the Attorney General is required to withhold deportation if he determines the alien comes within one of
the designated categories. 7 7 This change in the law necessarily
changes the role of the reviewing court. 78 Because the decision
is now mandatory if the alien can be classified within one of the
designated categories, the courts may properly review the case
to determine whether the decision regarding the alien's classifi-

72. Various policies are promoted by permitting the administrative process to run its course: (1) a more complete record may be developed;
(2) the agency is allowed to exercise its discretion; (3) the agency has the
opportunity to correct its own errors; and (4) the agency's authority is not
diminished by easy circumvention of its procedures. McKart v. United
States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969); Ecology Center of Louisiana, Inc. v. Coleman, 515
F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1975); Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442
(S.D. Fla. 1980).
73. 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1976). The general rule is that all administrative
remedies must be exhausted before resort may be had to judicial review.
McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969); Federal Power Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U.S. 375 (1938); Meyers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938). The denial of a request to withhold deportation is
considered a final order and courts of appeal have exclusive jurisdiction in
reviewing these cases. 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1976). The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1976), is inapplicable to deportation proceedings. It was the intention of Congress to prevent stalling tactics by
successive appeals through the federal courts. E.g., Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217
(1963). The current law eliminates suits in district courts as the initial step
in the judicial review process. 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1976).
74. See supra notes 7, 45, 48, 62, 68, 69 and accompanying text. Critics
questioned whether the Attorney General's discretion had been changed to
mandatory action after the Protocol had been signed. See infra note 97-98
and accompanying text.
75. All forms of obtaining refuge in the United States were discretionary
under prior law. See supra notes 7, 45, 48, 62, 68, 69 and accompanying text.
76. Luk v. Rosenberg, 409 F.2d 555 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 801
(1969); Wang v. Pilliod, 285 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1960). See also 1A GORDON &
ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, at § 8.17; Note, Section 243(h) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952 as Amended by the Refugee Act of 1980: A Prognosis and a Proposal,13 CORNELL INT'L L. REV. 291 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Section 243(h) ]. See generally supra note 7.
77. Only the decision to withhold deportation has become a mandatory
one. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. The discretionary nature of
the decision regarding entry is unchanged. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. The discretionary nature of the decision regarding an asylum
application is also unchanged. The current provision for asylum states that
the "alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General." 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis added).
78. McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981). See generally 2
GORDON &ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, at § 8.17.
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cation is supported by a substantial amount of evidence in the
record. 79 This more active role of the courts has added to the
controversy over the required burden of proof because, rather
than simply determining whether an abuse of discretion exists,
the reviewing court is permitted to examine more closely the actual standard used in making the decision. 0
Because the prior laws permitted the Attorney General's
decision to be based on discretion in all cases and because judicial review was limited, it is virtually impossible to determine
whether a single standard was being applied to all three groups
of aliens: refugees, asylum applicants, and applicants for withholding of deportation. The consensus, however, is that discrepancies did exist.8 ' There has been no independent case law for
the asylum category, but the burden of proof required appears
to have been the same standard required for applicants who requested withholding of deportation.8 2 Any distinction, therefore, would lie between the standard applied to applicants for
withholding of deportation and the standard applied to refugees.
Both standards were allegedly based on the concept of persecution, but the term "persecution" was never defined in the
immigration laws. 83 In the absence of criteria by which to judge

claims for withholding of deportation based on persecution, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) developed its
own criteria.8 4 Since there was never an absolute right to have
deportation withheld, 85 INS apparently reasoned that it was free
to limit the relief to those it believed most clearly deserving of
79. McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981). Reviewing courts
must determine that nondiscretionary exercises of authority are performed
according to the proper standard of the law. Id. at 1314. The case is re-

viewed to determine whether the decision is supported by a substantial
amount of evidence in the record as a whole. 2 GORDON & ROSENFIELD,

supra note 7, at § 8.17. See also supra note 7.
80. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
82. Where a finding is made that an alien's life or freedom would be
threatened in a given country such that deportation to that country should
be withheld, then it should also be found that the alien has established persecution in that country for asylum purposes. E.g., Matter of Salim, INS
Interim Dec. 2922 (Sept. 29, 1982); Matter of Lam, INS Interim Dec. 2857
(Mar. 24, 1981). See also Kurzban, supra note 9, at 107-10.
83. See, e.g., Cheng Kai Fu v. INS, 386 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968) (without showing clear probability of persecution,
no necessity to consider absence of standards). Cf. Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d
102 (9th Cir. 1969) (in absence of standards, word is given ordinary, everyday meaning). See generally 1A GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, at
§ 5.16; Note, Section 243(h), supra note 76, at 299-300.
84. Note, Right of Asylum, supra note 24, at 540. See also, infra note 89
and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 7, 8, 62 and accompanying text.
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protection. 86 INS viewed the statute as merely setting the outermost limits, while the agency retained the power to set more restrictive standards if it so desired. 87 Accordingly, INS developed
a "clear probability standard" for withholding applicants. A
withholding applicant was required to prove, through objective
and tangible evidence, that there was a clear probability that he
would be singled out as an individual or as a "target" for persecution if he were deported. 88 Courts, reviewing cases only for an
abuse of discretion, supported this position.8 9
Refugees, on the other hand, appeared to be subject to a
much less stringent test. The use of ad hoc and parole programs
permitted a very liberal approach. 90 Frequently, foreign policy
considerations, rather than individual determinations, were
used to decide eligibility. 91 Without adequate and independent
case law, it is relatively difficult to determine the exact standard
used by INS to decide the claims made by refugees abroad. The
Board of Immigration Appeals, however, did indicate that there
was a difference between the burden placed on refugees and
that required of withholding applicants. 92 Refugees were held to
86. Note, The Right of Asylum under United States Law, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 1125 (1980).
87. Id. at 1132.
88. The applicant must show a clear probability that he would be persecuted as an individual if returned. This is more than demonstrating the
simple fact of flight or the existence of human rights violations in the country from which asylum or withholding of deportation is sought. Proof of
generalized conditions in the country is not enough. The applicant's failure
to produce persuasive evidence that he would be singled out as a target for
persecution can be fatal to his claim. See, e.g., Matter of Joseph, 13 I. & N.
Dec. 70 (1968) (clear probability of persecution means that the alien must
show that he would be singled out as an individual by the government for
persecution); Matter of Tan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 564 (1967) (the respondent must
submit evidence that he would be subject to persecution); Matter of
Sihasale, 111. & N. Dec. 531, 532 (1966) (applicant has "obligation to set forth
the conditions relating to her personally which support her anticipation of
persecution").
89. The policy of restricting the favorable exercise of discretion to cases
in which the applicant can demonstrate the clear probability of persecution
of the particular individual has been sanctioned by the courts. Matter of
Tan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 564, 568 (1967). See, e.g., Cheng Kai Fu v. INS, 386 F.2d
750 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968) (only where there is a
clear probability of persecution of particular alien should discretion be favorably exercised); Lena v. INS, 379 F.2d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 1967) (requiring a
"clear probability of persecution of the particular individual petitioner").
See also 1A GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, at § 5.16.
90. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. See also Anker & Posner, supra note 2, at 20, n.49; Note, Crises, supra note 19, at 39.
91. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. See also Kurzban,
supra note 9, at 103; Note, The Right of Asylum Under United States Law,
supra note 86, at 1132.
92. INS never defined the standard applied to refugees, but generally
distinguished it from the clear probability standard by implying that it was
less exacting. See, e.g., Matter of Ugricic, 14 I. & N. Dec. 384 (1972) ("good
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a "good reason to fear" standard. 93 The refugee was only required to show objective evidence that the conditions in his
country provided a rational basis for his fear of persecution; he
did not have to prove that he had been, or would be, sought out
individually for persecution. 94 The "good reason to fear" standard was considered to be the functional equivalent of the international "well founded fear" standard used by the United
9 5

Nations Protocol.

reason to fear" persecution requirement is a lower standard than the "clear
probability" standard); Matter of Janus and Janek, 12 1. &N. Dec. 866 (1968)
(applicant for conditional entrant status not in same legal posture as an
applicant for withholding); Matter of Adamska, 12 I. & N. Dec. 201 (1967)
("good reason to fear" is lower requirement than "clear probability"); Matter of Tan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 564, 569-70 (1967) (no support that deportee is
required to meet only the standard applied to conditional entrant refugee).
93. The "good reason to fear" standard was alternatively known as "ra-

tional basis for fear." See supra note 92 and the cases cited therein.
94. Critics have charged that the standard applied to refugees is more
lenient than that applied to asylum or withholding applicants. Overseas,
little attention is devoted to the question of likely persecution as an individual. Proof of generalized conditions in the country from which asylum is
sought is usually sufficient. Martin, The Refugee Act of 1980: Its Past and
Future, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES 92 (1982); Note,
The Right of Asylum Under United States Law, supra note 86, at 1138.
95. Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401, 406 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted sub nom.,
I.N.S. v. Stevic, 103 S.Ct. 1249 (1983). In 1968, the United States signed the
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done Jan. 31,
1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force
with respect to the U.S. Nov. 1, 1968) [hereinafter cited as United Nations
Protocol]. The Protocol, with some minor changes, essentially extended
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 137. The United States was not a signatory to the Convention.
Weis, The Development of Refugee Law, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES 27 (1982).
The definition of refugee, as derived from the Protocol, refers to any
person who
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of
his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
United Nations Protocol, supra art. I (modifying the Convention) (emphasis added). The similarity between this definition and the definition in the
Act should be noted. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
The United Nations has published a guide to assist in determining the
meaning of well-founded fear as contained in the Protocol definition of refugee. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSION FOR REFUGEES,
HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STA-

TUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENIMON AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE
STATUS OF REFUGEES (1979) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES]. The handbook does not attempt to deal with the question of asy-

lum, but is intended to act as a practical guide in making determinations of
refugee status under the Convention or the Protocol. Id. at 1, 7. The handbook places the burden of proving refuges status on the applicant. Id. at 9.
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After the United States finally became a signatory to the
Protocol, there was a question whether the clear probability
standard for withholding applicants was obsolete. Critics reasoned that the treaty, as part of the supreme law of the land, 96
gave applicants direct access to benefits under the Protocol,
made withholding mandatory on the Attorney General, and
changed the burden of proof for withholding applicants to the
less restrictive "well founded fear standard" used by the Protocol.9 7 INS rejected these arguments by claiming that the burden
For a comparison to U.S. law on this burden, see supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
An entire section of the handbook is devoted to an interpretation of the
terms used by the Convention and the Protocol. HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES, supra, at 11. "Well-founded fear" is designated as the key phrase in
the definition of refugee. Id. The definition contains both subjective and
objective elements. Id. at 12. The objective elements of the definition must
be judged, at least in part, by the conditions in the applicant's country. Id.
The handbook clearly states, however, that these considerations "need not
necessarily be based on the applicant's own personal experience." Id. at 13.
While an applicant must show he has a good reason why he individually
fears persecution, he does not actually have to have been persecuted individually. Fear may also relate "to those who wish to avoid a situation entailing the risk of persecution."Id. (emphasis added). The applicant is deemed
to have established his claim if he demonstrates a rational basis for his fear.
Id. Compare this with the standards applied to refugees under U.S. law,
supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
96. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
97. Two sections of the United Nations Protocol are deemed to have superseded, and thus changed, the nature of the discretionary power granted
to the Attorney General under the withholding provisions. Article 32 of the
Protocol provides:
(1) The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their
territory save on grounds of national security or public order.
(2) The expulsion of such a refugee shall be only in pursuance of a
decision reached in accordance with due process of law. Except where
compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, the refugee
shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear himself, and to appeal to
and be represented for the purpose before competent authority or a
person or persons specially designated by the competent authority.
(3) The ContractingStates shall allow such a refugee a reasonable period within which to seek legal admission into another country. The
Contracting States reserve the right to apply during that period such
internal measures as they may deem necessary.
United Nations Protocol, supra note 95, ch. 5, art. 32 (emphasis added). Article 33 of the Protocol provides:
(1) No ContractingState shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
(2) The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed
by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been
convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.
Id. art. 33 (emphasis added). See also 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note
7,at § 2.3i; Frank, supra note 58, at 296; Note, The Right of Asylum Under
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of proof under the clear probability standard was the same as
that under the "well founded fear" or the "good reason" standards. 98
Reviewing courts generally supported INS; 99 the
courts, however, reached these decisions by applying the abuse
of discretion test, despite claims that the courts' standard of review had also been changed by the Protocol. 100
Setting aside possible deficiencies in the standard of review,
several reasons remain why these judicial interpretations were
overly broad and should not have been applied by subsequent
cases without being distinguished. First, INS stated that the
standards were the same and, later, reviewing courts simply
agreed with little or no analysis.' 0 ' Next, the expressions of congressional intent regarding the signing of the Protocol, on which
the decisions relied, were at best ambiguous and subject to conUnited States Law, supra note 86, at 1129, 1132; Note, Recent Developments,
14 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 561 (1981).

98. In rejecting various requests for withholding, INS contended that
the Protocol made no substantial changes in the withholding provision. Its
contention was based on the application of general rules of interpretation
which determine whether a treaty has repealed or modified a previously
enacted statute. INS concluded that, where there is an absence of clear legislative intent, repeals by implication are never favored. Since the treaty
was not regarded as absolutely incompatible with the prior legislation, INS
reasoned that it should try to give effect to both. Without extensive discussion, INS concluded that the standards under the Protocol and those under
the prior case law for withholding were co-extensive. Matter of Dunar, 14 I.
&N. Dec. 310 (1973) (seminal decision for clear probability standard). See
also Matter of Chumpitazi, 16 I. & N. Dec. 629 (1978). See generally 1
& ROSENFIELD, supra note 7, at § 2.3i; Frank, supra note 58; Note,
Recent Developments, supra note 97, at 580.
GORDON

99. Ming v. Marks, 367 F. Supp. 673, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd on opinion
below, 505 F.2d 1170, 1172 (2d Cir. 1974) (per curiam), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
911 (1975) (history of Protocol adoption clearly indicates all parties involved
in process believed Protocol would not alter or enlarge effect of existing
laws). Accord, Moghanian v. INS, 577 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1978); Martineau v.
INS, 556 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1977); Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1977);
Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1976); Rosa v. INS, 440 F.2d 100
(1st Cir. 1971). The Supreme Court declined to rule on this issue stating
"[iIt is premature to consider whether, and under what circumstances an
order of deportation might contravene the Protocol and Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the United States acceded on November 1, 1968." INS v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62, 79-80 n.22 (1969).
100. Because the Protocol made the withholding decision mandatory,
rather than one based on discretion, the proper review should have been
based on the substantial evidence test. See supra notes 7, 79 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Martineau v. INS, 556 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1977) (evidence
presented held not to show a "clear probability" without any further discussion); Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1977) (well founded fear standard and clear probability standard will, in practice, converge); CisternasEstay v. INS, 531 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1976) (held not to have shown a "clear
probability" of persecution without any further discussion); Rosa v. INS,
440 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1971) (used clear probability standard with no further
discussion).
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flicting interpretations. 10 2 Also, despite INS claims to the contrary, the withholding of deportation had been denied as an
exercise of discretion in a case of clear eligibility for refugee status. 10 3 Finally, the major cases cited by all later decisions involved claims that would be impermissible even under the
Protocol.' o4
Subsequent events indicate that criticism of INS policies
was correct.

0 5

A clear disparity existed between the standard

applied to asylum and withholding applicants and the standard
applied to refugees.10 6 Applicants for asylum or withholding
continued to be held to a higher, nearly impossible, 10 7 standard,
while refugees were only required to prove a "good reason to
102. The language used in the hearings on the Protocol was ambiguous.
It was not clear whether Congress intended to affect existing law by signing
the Protocol. For example, the Secretary of the State testified that the
"United States accession to the Protocol would not impinge adversely upon
the laws of this country." S. EXEC. K. 90th Cong., 2d Sess. at VII (1967).
Also, a representative of the State Department assured the Senate that the
"Protocol ... accession does not in any sense commit the contracting state
to enlarge its immigration measures for refugees." S. EXEC. REP. No. 14,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. at 6 (1967). Finally, in a letter making one brief, but
explicit, reference to the withholding provision, the Secretary of State in-

formed the President that "[t Ihis article is comparable to Section 243(h) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Section 1254 [sic], and it can
be implemented within the administrative discretion provided by existing
regulations." S. ExEc. K., 90th Cong., 2d Sess. at VIII (1967).
This language is susceptible to various interpretations. What constitutes adverse impingement? What was meant by expanding or enlarging
immigration commitment? Implementation within the administrative discretion provided by existing regulations could mean that Congress intended the Attorney General simply to use his discretion within the
existing framework in order to adhere to the guidelines of the Protocol. Because the remarks do not expressly state that the law would remain unchanged, they are equally consistent with the proposition that the Protocol
did change the protection available. Compare this with the express language used in the hearings on the Refugee Act, supra notes 37, 66 and accompanying text, infra notes 113-114 and accompanying text. See also infra
note 158 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., Matter of Liao, 111. & N. Dec. 113 (1965) (Attorney General
may deny an application for withholding without making any formal finding
regarding eligibility).
104. Some applicants attempted to assert a claim that a totally subjective
standard was permissible under the Protocol. See, e.g., Kashani v. INS, 547
F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1977); Matter of Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310 (1973). The
Protocol, however, requires objective evidence in addition to subjective elements. See supra note 95. The point apparently overlooked by the courts
was the distinction in the nature of the objective evidence required. Requiring evidence to prove that persecution is individualized is more restrictive than merely requiring evidence which demonstrates a rational basis for
the fear of persecution. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
105. Martin, supra note 94, at 111-13.
106. Id.; Scanlan, supra note 5, at 633; Note, The Right of Asylum Under
United States Law, supra note 86, at 1137; Note, Right of Asylum, supra
note 24, at 544.
107. Kurzban, supra note 9, at 104-13.
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fear." One explanation is that INS was attempting to limit the
flow of immigration through interpretive measures. 10 8 Even
before the Refugee Act was passed, some courts had begun to
defect from the INS position. 10 9 The questions remain, however,
whether the Act was intended to resolve this disparity between
the groups and, if so, whether the clear probability or the good
reason to fear standard was intended by Congress.
THE BURDEN OF PROOF ACCORDING TO THE REFUGEE ACT

Passage of the Act undermined the INS claim that Congress
had intended no changes in the law when it signed the Protocol." 0 The ambiguous langauge used by Congress in considering the Protocol was replaced by clear and express language in
the hearings on the Act."' The consensus is that Congress no
longer trusted INS to amend its own procedures administratively; instead changes were mandated by Congress through
statute. 112 Congress intended one standard to be used for all
groups and that standard was the Protocol's well-founded fear
standard. As discussed below, the legislative history of the Act,
the language of the provisions, and the announced public policy
all support this position.
While considering the proposed legislation, Congress repeatedly expressed its intention that the language used in the
Act was to be based on the Protocol."13 Congress reiterated its
intent by stating that all language should be construed in a man108. Note, The Right of Asylum Under United States Law, supra note 86,
at 1137.
109. E.g., Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977) (announcing a sub-

stantial evidence test and remanding the case for a new hearing).
110. Note, Right of Asylum, supra note 24, at 559. The reforms made by
the Act support the view that the Protocol was intended to have some effect
on the law. Note, The Right of Asylum Under United States Law, supra
note 86, at 1131. See also supra notes 98, 102 and accompanying text.
111. Anker &Posner, supra note 2, at 46; Note, The Right of Asylum Under
United States Law, supra note 86, at 1130; Note, Right of Asylum, supra
note 24, at 545, 559. Compare Congress's language supra in note 102 with
language supra notes 1, 2, 6, 32, 66.
112. Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401, 406 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted sub nom,

I.N.S. v. Stevic, 103 S. Ct. 1249 (1983) (Congress has implemented Protocol
rights through Refugee Act). See also Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 218-19
(2d Cir. 1982) (citing Stevic for proposition that no rights beyond those

under domestic law). See generally, 1 GORDON &ROSENFIELD, supra note 7,
at §§ 2.3i, 2.24Af; Martin, supra note 94, at 109; Anker & Posner, supra note 2,
at 41. Compare supra note 102 (ability to make changes administratively)

with supra note 64 (withholding provision mandatory).

113. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. See also 1 GORDON &RoSENFIELD, supra note 7, at § 2.24Ab; Legislative History, supra note 2, at 11,
46, 63; Scanlan, supra note 5, at 621-25; Note, The Right of Asylum Under

United States Law, supra note 86, at 1131-32; Note, Right of Asylum, supra
note 24, at 540, 559.
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ner consistent with the Protocol. 114 The standard used by the
Protocol is based on a well-founded fear, 115 which is the functional equivalent of the good reason standard INS traditionally
applied to refugees. 116 Continued use of the higher clear
probability standard, therefore, would be inconsistent with the
language of the Protocol. 117 By selecting the Protocol standard,
Congress, at the very least, expressed its intent to adopt a burden of proof lower than the clear probability standard. 1 8
Moreover, Congress intended that the standard it adopted
should be applied uniformly to all groups-refugees as well as
applicants for asylum or for withholding of deportation. 1 9 According to the language of the statutes, 120 the definition of refu12
gee applies to both refugees and applicants for asylum. '
Although the withholding statute does not expressly refer to the
definition of refugee, 122 the definition is implied through the use
of similar criteria. 123 Substitution of the phrase "life or freedom
would be threatened" for the word "persecution" is not intended
to change the prior law requiring persecution; 24 the difference
in terminology does not create a significant distinction between
114. S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
& AD. NEWS 515, 535 (new refugee definition will bring the United
States into conformity with the Protocol; withholding provision is based directly on the Protocol and is intended that the provision be interpreted in a
manner consistent with the Protocol).
115. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
CONG.

117. A.

GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INT'L LAw

145 (1965)

(well founded fear standard of Protocol requires a liberal interpretation);
Comment, Immigration Law and the Refugee-A Recommendation to Harmonize the Statutes with the Treaties, 6 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 129, 152 (1975)

(well founded fear standard requires a lesser burden of proof than clear
probability).
118. Stevic v. Seva, 678 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted sub nom,
I.N.S. v. Stevic, 103 S. Ct. 1249 (1983). See also Note, The Right of Asylum
Under United States Law, supra note 86, at 1131-32; Note, Right of Asylum,
supra note 24, at 559.
119. It is the consensus of commentators that the Act intended to create
equivalent eligibility standards. Anker & Posner, supra note 2, at 10, 48, 60;
Scanlan, supra note 5, at 625; Note, The Right of Asylum Under United
States Law, supra note 86, at 1137; Note, Crises, supra note 19, at 46; Note,
Recent Developments, supra note 97, at 563.
120. See supra notes 38, 48 and accompanying text.
121. Id. See also Anker & Posner, supra note 2, at 60; Scanlan, supra note
5, at 625; Note, The Right of Asylum Under United States Law, supra note 86,
at 1137; Note, Crises, supra note 19, at 46; Note, Recent Developments, supra
note 97, at 563.
122. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
123. E.g., Matter of Lam, INS Interim Dec. 2857 at 4-5 (Mar. 24, 1981)
(alien qualifying under asylum or refugee provisions must prove same five
elements as applicant for withholding).
124. Id. at 5 n.3 ("no significant distinction" between withholding or asylum because of use of "life or freedom" rather than "persecution").
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the groups. 12 5 This interpretation is reinforced by reference to
the Protocol articles, which are the source of the language used
in the withholding statute. 126 These articles apply to "refugees,"
as defined by the Protocol, 127 which is, again, the same definition
used in the Refugee Act. 128 As a matter of course, all provisions
in the Refugee Act ultimately rely upon the same definition of
refugee and that definition is based upon the Protocol's wellfounded fear standard.
This interpretation of the standard and its applicability to
all groups of aliens conforms to the announced public policy of
the Act. 129 The lawmakers repeatedly went on record to affirm
the humanitarian basis for the Act. 130 Accordingly, it would be
implausible that Congress, intending to create a uniform standard where two had previously existed, would choose the higher
standard. 13' It is more credible that the uniform standard chosen by Congress was the "well-founded fear" or "good reason"
standard. 132 There is no indication that Congress intended to
undo the reforms made in refugee legislation over the years; on
the contrary, Congress expressed its intent to make its policy
133
even more humanitarian than it had previously been.
THE BURDEN OF PROOF SINCE THE REFUGEE ACT

In spite of the expressed intent of the Act, covert discrimination continues. 34 INS has continued to apply the clear
probability standard to asylum and withholding cases decided
125. Matter of McMullen, 17 I. &N. Dec. 542 (1980) (use of word persecution instead of "life or freedom" is not a significant distinction).
126. The provisions of Articles 32 and 33 both use the term "refugee"
which is defined in Article 1 of the Protocol. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. See also Note, The Right ofAsylum Under United States Law,
supra note 86, at 1136-37; Note, Right of Asylum, supra note 24, at 559-60.
127. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.

128. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. See also Anker & Posner,
supra note 2, at 11, 38, 64; Scanlan, supra note 5, at 626; Note, The Right of
Asylum Under United States Law, supra note 86, at 1138; Note, Right of Asy-

lum, supra note 24, at 540, 559.
130. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
131. Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401 (1982), cert. granted sub nom., I.N.S. v.
Stevic, 103 S. Ct. 1249 (1983).
132. Id.
133. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. See also Anker &Posner,
supra note 2, at 64; Note, The Right of Asylum Under United States Law,
supra note 86, at 1132.
134. Martin, supra note 94, at 112-13; Anker &Posner, supra note 2, at 69,
72, 78; Note, The Right of Asylum Under United States Law, supra note 8, at
1132.
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since the passage of the Act. 135 The decisions in these cases are
based on the previous INS theory that the clear probability stan136
dard is the equivalent of the well-founded fear standard.
Changes in judicial review, 137 however, have permitted the
courts greater freedom in examining the standard which INS is
applying to these cases. Stevic v. Immigration and Naturalization Service 138 is the leading case in this area. In that case, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit directly
confronted the issue of whether INS had properly applied the
correct burden of proof under the Act. 139 The Stevic court considered the legislative intent behind the Act, the Act's language,
and the public policy expressed by Congress. 14° It then determined that Congress had intended the well-founded fear standard to be uniformly applied to applicants for asylum or
135. E.g., Matter of Martinez-Romero, INS Interim Dec. 2872 (June 30,
1981) (conclusory assertions and generalized evidence do not establish applicant would be subject to persecution); Matter of Lam, INS Interim Dec.
2857 (March 24, 1981) (alien failed to show he had been persecuted); Matter
of Castellon, 17 I. & N. Dec. 616 (1981) (unsupported claims); Matter of McMullen, 17 I. & N. Dec 542 (1980) (evidence should relate to respondent specifically); Matter of Rodriguez-Palma, 17 I. & N. Dec. 465 (1980) (no evidence
to support claims).
136. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
138. 658 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted sub nom., I.N.S. v. Stevic, 103
S. Ct. 1849 (1983). Stevic was a citizen of Yugoslavia who originally entered
the United States on June 8, 1976, for the purpose of visiting his sister. Id. at
402. When his permission to remain expired, Stevic neither left nor obtained an extension; deportation proceedings were subsequently commenced. Stevic agreed to depart voluntarily, but failed to do so. Instead, he
married a United States citizen; she filed a relative petition for him which
was the first step toward obtaining his permanent resident status. Stevic's
spouse was accidently killed and the approval of her petition was automatically revoked under 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a) (2) (1983). Deportation proceedings
were resumed and Stevic then expressed his fear of persecution if he was
returned to Yugoslavia. Stevic was denied asylum and withholding of deportation; his appeals were dismissed by the Board of Immigration appeals.
Because of Stevic's repeated refusals to surrender for deportation, INS took
him into custody. He was transported in INS custody to New York City to
be placed on board a connecting flight for Yugoslavia. Stevic attempted to
escape and was then temporarily detained. He thereupon commenced proceedings for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York and for a motion to reopen his deportation hearing before the Board of Immigration Appeals. The Second Circuit
consolidated the appeals from the district court's denial of habeas corpus
and from the Board's denial of the motion to reopen deportation.
139. 658 F.2d at 404. Stevic claimed that the Board of Immigration Appeals applied the wrong standard to his second motion to reopen deportation proceedings. He argued that the passage of the Act prior to his second
motion changed the standard to be applied.
140. Id. at 404-09. The Stevic court traced in detail the origins of the Act.
Id. at 404-07. The decision contains large sections reviewing pre-1968 asylum law, the Protocol, asylum law between 1968 and 1980, and the Act itself.
Id. at 404-09.
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withholding of deportation as well as to refugees.1 4 1 The Stevic
court concluded that INS, in using the clear probability standard
for asylum or withholding applicants, was not performing according to the proper standard required by law.142 The court remanded the case for a hearing under a standard less restrictive
143
than the clear probability standard.
The reasoning of the Stevic court has been adopted by at
least three other courts. In Reyes v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,'" the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that there was substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the alien's application for withholding
of deportation. 145 In Ellis v. Ferro,' 46 the United States District
Court for the Western District of New York relied upon the
Stevic decision in reaching its determination that an evidentiary
141. Id. at 407-08. The Stevic court found that the Act "dictates that a

uniform test of 'refugee' be applied to all aliens, whether seeking admission" as refugees or as applicants for asylum or withholding. Id. at 408.
142. Id. at 409. The Stevic court found that the clear probability test was
"no longer the applicable guide for administrative practice" under the Act.
Id. at 408. It reasoned that the Act "completed the process, begun with accession to he Protocol, of modifying the legal test applicable to [withholding] applications." Id.
143. Id. The court conceded that the "matter is hardly free from doubt"
and that there is no "bright line drawn in the legislative history." Id. at 404,
408. The court maintained, however, that it found "meaningful guideposts"
for its decision that, at minimum, Stevic was entitled to a plenary hearing
under the standards established by the Protocol. Id. at 408.
144. 693 F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1982). Reyes was a twenty-two year old Filipino woman who originally entered the United States on August 15, 1975, as
an exchange visitor under the Youth for Understanding Program. Id. at 598.
She failed to leave upon the termination of her program and deportation
proceedings were initiated. She requested asylum and withholding during
the deportation hearing. Id. In support of her claim that she would be persecuted for her political beliefs, Reyes submitted newspaper and magazine
articles regarding the lack of human and civil rights in the Philippines and
affidavits from individuals. Id. at 599. The Immigration Judge and the
Board of Immigration Appeals, on review, denied both of her requests. Id.
at 598.
145. Id. The Reyes court found that the clear probability test was 'inconsistent with the tenor and spirit, if not the language, of the new provisions."
It further stated that "[slince the Board applied the more stringent clear
probability test, the holding cannot stand." Id. The court concluded that
"in considering the record as a whole, we not only find that there is not
substantial support in the record for the conclusions of the Board, but that
overwhelming evidence supports petitioner's claim." Id. at 600. The Reyes
court asserted that it was difficult "to see what more than what was offered
here [should be required] short of actual persecution after the fact." Id.
146. 549 F. Supp. 428 (W.D.N.Y. 1982). Ellis was a citizen of Ireland who
was refused legal admission into the United States. Id. at 429. He was
taken into custody and prepared for a formal hearing which would exclude
him from entering the United States. During this proceeding, Ellis requested asylum. Id. Before any action was taken by INS on that request,
Ellis filed a writ of habeas corpus with the district court. Id. at 430. The
request for asylum was eventually denied. Id. at 431.
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hearing should be held and that the parties should submit memoranda regarding the relevant standards. 147 Finally, in Almirol
v. Immigration and NaturalizationService,l4 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California applied the
Stevic analysis to an application for a waiver of the foreign residence requirement 149 which was based on a fear of persecution.
The Almirol court held that the applicant had the option of proving persecution in fact, or a fear of persecution based on objective evidence. 5 0 The Almirol court further stated, however, that
objective evidence was not required to prove that the applicant
151
was a "target" of a particular government.
To date, only one court has adopted the INS position. In
147. Id. at 434. The court found Ellis was entitled to a plenary hearing on
his asylum claim under the Protocol standard. Id. at 433. The Ellis court
made specific reference to the Stevic case in reaching its decision. Id.
148. 550 F. Supp. 253 (N.D. Cal. 1982). Almirol was a citizen of the Philippines who originaly entered the United States as an exchange visitor. Id. at
254. He requested a waiver of the requirement that he return to his country
for two years before seeking permanent residence in the United States
based on his claim of a fear of persecution if he returned to the Philippines.
His request was denied by the district director and his appeal dismissed.
He then brought an action in the district court to seek judicial review of the
final INS decision. Id.
149. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(e) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). A nonimmigrant alien admitted as a foreign exchange visitor may be subject to a requirement that
he return to the country of his nationality or of his last residence for two
years before he is permitted to obtain permanent residence in the United
States. Id. The requirement may arise as a result of government funds
being used to sponsor his program or as a result of his government stating
that his skills are in short supply in that country. A waiver may be granted
on the basis of hardship, fear of persecution, or a no-objection letter from
the alien's government.
150. Almirol v. INS, 550 F. Supp. 253 (N.D. Cal. 1982). The Almirol court
reasoned that the decision of INS should not be reversed unless there was
an abuse of discretion or there was an improper understanding of the law.
Id. at 254. The issue the court confronted was whether INS had applied the
proper legal standard to Almirol's request. Id. at 255. The court found that
the history of the waiver for the foreign residence requirement indicated
that the provision is consistent with the authority to withhold deportation.
Id. Consequently, the court was compelled to review the decisions of other
courts which had considered similar provisions in the context of the applicable standard of proof for persecution. Id.
151. Id. at 256. The court drew a distinction between the clear
probability standard and the well-founded fear standard. The court rejected the contention that the applicant was "required to show that he was
the 'target' of the Philippine government's persecution." Id. The court distinguished the cases cited by the attorneys for INS, stating that "[i]n each
of those cases, the courts found a lack of any factual support or objective
evidence for the plaintiffs allegations." Id. (emphasis in original). The
court remanded the case for reconsideration under the well-founded fear
standard. Id. Cf., Order, Regional Commissioner, INS Northern Regional
Office (March 1, 1983) (dismissing appeal to denial of § 212(e) waiver because evidence did not refer to applicant personally, despite recognition
that applicant "and his family will be subject to various adversities.")
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Rejaie v. Immigration and NaturalizationService,152 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit expressly rejected
the Stevic opinion 153 and stated that the standards of wellfounded fear and of clear probability are co-extensive. 5 4 To
date, no cases have followed the Rajaie decision.
An analysis of the Rejaie decision reveals several deficiencies in the court's reasoning. For example, the Rejaie court accepted the INS claim that the standards are equal without any
critical examination of the meaning previously given each
term.1 55 In addition, the Rejaie court ignored INS decisions
which made a distinction between the standards. l5 6 The court
repeatedly described the legislative intent in changing the law
as a mere clarification, 15 7 but the court never explained why
changes would be made simply for clarification, particularly if
152. 691 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1982). The Rejaie court has relied on its own
decision for at least one other case. See, Marroquin-Manriquez v. INS, 699

F.2d 129, 133 (3d Cir. 1983) (relying on Rejaie to reject claim that clear
probability standard is incorrect). Two other courts have had the burden of
proof issue before them. Both courts failed, however, to define any specific
standard. In both cases, the courts evaded the issue by holding that the
applicant's claims would have failed even under the Stevic standard. See,
Minwalla v. INS, 706 F.2d 831, 835 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1983); Choafee v. INS, 706
F.2d 1079, 1084 (9th Cir. 1983).
153. 691 F.2d 139, 146. Rejaie was a citizen of Iran who originally entered
the United States as a student. Id. at 141. Rejaie failed to attend the school
for which he had been authorized and he failed to extend the time in which
he was permitted to remain in the United States. He was subsequently prepared for a deportation hearing at which he was granted permission to depart the United States voluntarily. Rather than depart, he submitted a
request for asylum which was denied; the Board of Immigration Appeals
later denied two motions to reopen. Id. at 145. Rejaie contended that the
wrong burden of proof had been applied to his request. Id. at 142. His argument was based on Stevic. Id. at 144-45. The Rejaie court cited three principal bases of error in Stevic. According to the Rejaie court, Stevic attributed
a stringency to the phrase "clear probability" that was not consistent with
prior opinions within Stevic's own circuit. Id. at 146. Also, the Rejaie court
stated that Stevic failed to appreciate the "caselaw consensus. . . that the
two standards were equivalent." Id. Finally, the Rejaie court stated Stevic
misinterpreted the legislative history behind the Act. Id.
154. Id. at 146. The Rejaie court relied on cases decided before the Refugee Act of 1980 which had held that the standards were equivalent. Id. at
143, 146. See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
155. The Rejaie court examined only two such cases. Rejaie v. INS, 691
F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1982). The court did not review other cases to determine
whether the standards had been applied in different ways. The Stevic court
did. Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401, 405-07 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted sub nom,
I.N.S. v. Stevic, 103 S. Ct. 1249 (1983).
156. For example, the Stevic decision relied in part on the holding in the
Tan case. Stevic v. Sava, 658 F.2d 401, 405 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted sub
nom., I.N.S. v. Stevic, 103 S. Ct. 1249 (1983). Tan is discussed supra at note
92. The Rejaie court did not even consider Tan.
157. Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 1982) (calling the Act "cosmetic surgery").
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there was nothing which needed to be clarified. 158 Finally, the
Rejaie court relied upon an alleged case law consensus 159 which
was not readily apparent. 160
ALTERNATIVES

INS has endorsed Rejaie and rejected Stevic. 161 Despite
this public stand, the Board of Immigration Appeals has now
adopted the well-founded fear "label" for the decisions it has
made since the Stevic case. 162 A careful examination of those
158. In a similar manner, INS had tried to dismiss the effects of the signing of the Protocol. INS interpreted Senate ratification of the Protocol as a
symbolic gesture to human rights and as an impetus for encouraging other
nations to reform their own immigration laws. Matter of Dunar, 14 I. & N.
Dec. 310 (1973) (citing the President's message to the Senate, S. EXEC. K.,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. III (1967)).
159. Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 1982).
160. Many of the cases relied upon by INS can be distinguished and do
not comprise a consensus. Almirol v. INS, 550 F. Supp. 253 (N.D. Cal. 1982)
(cases relied on by INS failed to present any factual support or objective
evidence).
161. On December 31, 1982, the general counsel for INS distributed a
memorandum to all INS regional counsels. The purpose of the memorandum was to set forth the INS position in regard to the standard of proof
applicable to requests for asylum, particularly when Stevic is cited. The
general counsel advised the INS attorneys to adhere to the holding in the
Exilus case. (The Exilus decision is discussed infra note 162). In addition,
the INS attorneys were encouraged to cite the Rejaie decision. Memorandum from Maurice C. Inman, Jr. to all regional counsels (Dec. 21, 1982) (regarding standard of proof in asylum cases).
162. See, e.g., Matter of Exilus, INS Interim Dec. 2914 (Aug. 3, 1982):
The law is well settled that an applicant for asylum or for withholding
of exclusion and deportation bears the burden of proving that he has a
welifoundedfear of persecution if he returns to his native land. Fleurinor v. INS, 585 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1978); Martineauv. INS, 556 F.2d 306
(5th Cir. 1977); Henry v. INS, 552 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1977); Daniel v. INS,
528 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1976). This language refers to more than the
alien's subjective state of mind. He must establish that he is likely to
be persecuted on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion. See Kashani v. INS, 547
F.2d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 1977); see also McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312 (9th
Cir. 1981).
Id. at 3 (Emphasis added). The authorities cited by the INS in Excilus are
interesting. Conspicuous by its absence is the Dunar case which has been
considered the seminal decision in this area. See Matter of Dunar, 14 I. & N.
Dec. 310 (1973). See also supra notes 98, 104. The Kashani case has also
been extensively cited by INS for the clear probability standard, but in this
decision its application was limited. See Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376 (7th
Cir. 1977). See also supra notes 99, 101, 104. In addition, INS was the losing
party in the McMullen case. McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981)
(substantial evidence did not support INS determination that alien had
failed to show a sufficient likelihood of persecution for his political beliefs).
Finally, INS cited only decisions from the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit for the use of "well founded fear" standard. Matter of Exilus, INS
Interim Dec. 2914 (Aug. 3, 1982). The Fifth Circuit has apparently always
been more liberal in its application of the standard of proof. E.g., Coriolan
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decisions indicates, however, that INS has actually continued to
apply the clear probability standard. 163 In effect, the INS has
used the well-founded fear "label" as a disguise. Moreoever,
INS has apparently discovered a means of avoiding the issue altogether. Many recent decisions issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals have granted withholding of deportation, but
have denied asylum as a matter of discretion. 64 Because withholding of deportation is specific only with reference to the
country in which persecution can be shown, the INS decision to
grant withholding provided only temporary relief to the applicant. In these cases, the applicant was still deportable to an16 5
other country.
The Rejaie court claimed it had rejected a view that would
"make a fortress out of a dictionary."'166 In fact, the Rejaie court
fell victim to just that tactic. INS continues to use two different
standards, but simply affixes the same label to both' 67-a
change without a difference. There may, however, be practical
considerations which explain why INS has adopted two different
standards.
The United States is experiencing many of the problems associated with being a country of initial mass asylum. Throughv. INS, 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977). See also, Matter of Salim, INS Interim
Dec. 2922 (Sept. 29, 1982); Matter of Exame, INS Interim Dec. 2920 (Sept. 3,
1982).
163. Although the label "well founded fear" has appeared in connection
with the required burden of proof, the decisions still refer to a lack of evidence relating to the alien individually or as a "target" which is the essence
of the clear probability standard. E.g., Matter of Exilus, INS Interim Dec.
2914 (Aug. 3, 1982) (nothing related to applicant individually or specifically).
See also Matter of Exame, INS Interim Dec. 2920 (Sept. 3, 1982) (ultimate
test is whether objective evidence of record is significantly probative of the
likelihood of persecution to this particular alien). See supra note 89 and
accompanying text.
164. E.g., Walai v. INS, 552 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (fraudulently obtained entry documents); Matter of Salim, INS Interim Dec. 2922 (Sept. 29,
1982) (fraudulently obtained entry documents); Matter of Lam, INS Interim
Dec. 2857 (Mar. 24, 1981) (firmly resettled in third country).
165. E.g., Walai v. INS, No. 82 Civ. 779 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1982) (Afghan
returned to Pakistan); Matter of Salim, INS Interim Dec. 2922 (Sept. 29,
1982) (Afghan returned to Pakistan); Matter of Lam, INS Interim Dec. 2857
(Mar. 24, 1981) (mainland Chinese returned to Hong Kong). See also supra
note 61 and accompanying text.
166. Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 1982) (citing Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.), a.fd, 326 U.S. 404 (1945)). The court elaborated on its view by stating that a word or a phrase "is not a crystal,
transparent and unchanged[; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary
greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in
which it is used." Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 1982) (quoting
Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918)).
167. Martin, supra note 94, at 112-13; Anker & Posner, supra note 2, at 69,
72, 78; Scanlan, supra note 5, at 633; Note, The Right of Asylum Under United
States Law, supra note 86, at 1132, 1137.
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out its history, the United States generally could pick and
choose whom it wanted from among camps located in other
countries. 68 Now, in unprecedented numbers, aliens are claiming asylum after they arrive in the United States. 69 While limits
may exist on how many refugees may enter the United States,
there is no limit on how many aliens may apply for asylum or
withholding of deportation after they have entered in some
other status. 7 0 Granting benefits based upon the same standard, whether the applicant is physically present in the United
States or not, could logically only induce more aliens to enter
7
the United States for the purpose of pursuing their claims.' '
Rather than having to wait for a decision in a refugee camp, the
alien would simply come to the United States to wait. In addition, this policy would encourage other kinds of fraud. Frequently, for example, frivolous requests for asylum or
withholding are used by aliens to delay or stall their departure
72
from the United States.
Recognizing that these problems exist and that a single liberal standard may only contribute to them is more useful than
pretending that there is really a uniform standard which is applied equally. Some alternatives have been suggested by commentators in the field. One suggestion is that the standard for
all groups be uniformly raised, thus requiring applicants for refugee status to meet the same criteria as applicants for asylum
and withholding. 73 In addition to the practical problems this
may create,'7 4 that suggestion does not appear to comply with
168. Scanlan, supra note 5, at 621, 627; Note, Crises, supra note 19.
169. It is estimated that between 45,000 and 50,000 potential asylum seekers will arrive in the United States each year. Scanlan, supra note 5, at 627.
170. The only limitation exists on how many aliens granted asylum may
receive the benefit of permanent residence in any given fiscal year. "Not
more than five thousand of the refugee admissions authorized under section 207(a) in any fiscal year may be made available by the Attorney General ... to adjust to the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence the status of any alien granted asylum ... " 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b)
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
171. According to the dissent in the Coriolan case,
It is no wonder that it has been publicly asserted by those in position to
know that there are millions of aliens illegally in this country, taking
jobs from those who complain bitterly of the lack of job opportunity, a
deficiency to be remedied by lifting more funds from law abiding taxpayers, thereby in effect subsidizing the illegal alien racket. There is
one thing for sure-the majority opinion is not going to help in stemming the tide.
Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d 993, 1006 (5th Cir. 1977) (Coleman, J., dissenting).

172. Frank, supra note 51, at 305; Note, Section 243(h), supra note 76, at
307.
173. Martin, supra note 94, at 112-13.
174. More stringent scrutiny overseas would require additional staff and
resources without any corresponding increase in the benefits derived. The
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the congressional intent of the Act. 75 Another suggestion is
that the applicants for asylum or withholding satisfy the same
criteria as applicants for refugee status. 176 Although this suggestion conforms to the congressional intent of the Act, 177 it does
not resolve the practical problems mentioned above. 78 Suggestions that the withholding provision be eliminated altogether
are without merit because they fail to recognize the distinction
179
between asylum and withholding.
A sounder approach might be to recognize that the dual
standard not only exists, but is necessary and appropriate. 80
This suggestion would require new legislation.' 81 As the law
now stands, even aliens who enter the United States in flagrant
disregard of the law cannot be deported if they apply for asylum
or withholding. 182 Such aliens not only avoid the prescreening
required of all other aliens entering the country, 183 they also obtain additional benefits as a direct result of their violations. For
example, aliens overseas have no right to appeal if they are denied entry, 184 but aliens within the United States-no matter
how they entered-are entitled to the Constitutional guarantees
fact that the applicant for refugee status is in another country is usually
assurance enough that he cannot enter the United States unless selected

for resettlement. Martin, supra note 94, at 113.
175. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
176. Martin, supra note 94, at 112-13.
177. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.

178. See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text. According to one
commentator,
[a ] sylum constitutes a wild card in the immigration deck. No other provision of the [Immigration and Nationality Act] opens such a broad po-

tential prospect of U.S. residency ... if it becomes too easy to establish
entitlement to asylum, if the United States does not stringently require
the applicant to show solid reasons why he or she is likely to be singled

out for persecution on return, then great numbers of illegal aliens
would probably be happy to surface and claim the benefits of asylum.
The United States is also accessible to thousands more in the Caribbean, Central America, and conceivably, in South America, who would

leave countries with poor enough human rights records to make any
claim to asylum at least initially plausible.

Martin, supra note 94, at 112-13.
179. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. See also Kurzban, supra
note 19, at 110; Scanlan, supra note 5, at 637.
180. Martin, supra note 94, at 113.
181. Id.
182. With few exceptions, most exclusion grounds which would ordina-

rily bar an alien from receivin permanent residence, are waived for refugees
and aliens who have been granted asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c) (1976 &Supp.
IV 1980). See also 8 C.F.R. § 209.2 (1983).

183. Martin, supra note 94, at 112. Even an alien who obtains his entry
surreptitiously may be granted asylum and, eventually, permanent residence. INS, Operations Instructions, 209.2(e) (1982).
184. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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of due process and judicial review. 185 Applicants with legitimate
claims should be encouraged to enter the United States in the
proper status as refugees. Requiring more in the way of proof
from aliens who present their claims after entry may have this
effect.
CONCLUSION

Prior to the passage of the Refugee Act, refugees and applicants for asylum or withholding of deportation were required to
satisfy different standards in proving their eligibility for the benefit sought. The Refugee Act of 1980 was intended to equalize
the standard for the burden of proof. The standard to be applied
was the less restrictive, well-founded fear standard used by the
United Nations Protocol. In spite of this mandate, INS has continued to apply, both expressly and covertly, the higher clear
probability standard to applicants for asylum or withholding of
deportation. Practical problems generated by applying the less
restrictive refugee standard to applicants for asylum or withholding indicate that the standards should be distinct. The
choice, however, does not belong to INS; the choice is for Congress to make. Until Congress changes the statutory language
that requires the uniform application of the well-founded fear
186
standard, INS should administer the law as it was intended.
Virginia A. Smith

185. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1967); Galvan v. Press, 347
U.S. 522 (1954); Wong Yan Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
186. Note, The Right of Asylum Under United States Law, supra note 86,
at 1138.

